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E M P L O Y M E N T D I S C R I M I N AT I O N
Does the ADEA’s Federal-Sector Provision Require a Plaintiff to Prove that
Age Was a But-For Cause of the Challenged Personnel Action?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) allegedly discriminated against Dr. Noris Babb, a clinical
pharmacist over age 40, based on age, in violation of Section 633a(a), the federal-sector provision of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Citing binding in-circuit precedent, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA on grounds that Babb failed
to show that age was a but-for cause of the challenged personnel actions, thereby rejecting Babb’s
contention that a motivating-factor standard should be applied. In this context, the Court will consider
the question of which causation standard the ADEA’s federal-sector provision requires, thereby resolving
an important federal question and a split in authority.

Babb v. Wilkie
Docket No. 18-882
Argument Date: January 15, 2020
From: The Eleventh Circuit
by Anne Marie Lofaso
West Virginia University College of Law, Morgantown, WV

INTRODUCTION
The federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), states that “[a]ll personnel actions
affecting employees or applicants for employment” in executive
agencies “who are at least 40 years of age * * * shall be made
free from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)
(emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit and certain federal agencies
have held that a plaintiff bringing a claim under this provision
need only prove that “age was a factor in the employer’s decision.”
See Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2010). By contrast,
two circuits have applied a but-for causation analysis. See Babb
v. Secretary, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 743 Fed.Appx. 280 (2018);
Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 607 (9th Cir. 2012).

ISSUE
Does the ADEA’s federal-sector provision, which provides that
personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or
older shall be made free from any “discrimination based on age,”
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), require a plaintiff to prove that age was a butfor cause of the challenged personnel action?

FACTS
This case concerns the causation standard federal employees must
meet to show that the government employer engaged in unlawful
age discrimination. Petitioner-plaintiff Dr. Noris Babb, a long-term
clinical pharmacist for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
iled an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint and then a
suit in district court alleging that the VA had engaged in age-plus-
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gender discrimination in violation of the federal-sector provisions
of the ADEA and Title VII when it (1) removed her qualiication
(advanced-scope designation) necessary for certain promotion
opportunities; (2) rejected her applications for certain promotions
and instead promoted two younger males; (3) denied her training
opportunities; and (4) gave her inferior holiday pay beneits.
She further alleged that the VA had retaliated against her for
supporting her colleagues’ complaints of gender discrimination.
The district court granted the VA’s motion for summary judgment.
Applying the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), burden-shifting framework, the court held that, although
Babb had established a prima facie case of gender and age
discrimination and retaliation, she could not show that these
were the but-for causes of the challenged personnel actions,
because she had not shown that the VA’s proffered alternative
nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.
The Eleventh Circuit afirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. First, the court of appeals afirmed the district court’s
application of a but-for causation standard to Babb’s ADEA
age-discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims. The court of
appeals acknowledged that if it were “writing on a clean slate,” it
“might well agree” with Babb that such claims should be governed
by a “motivating-factor (rather than but-for) causation standard.”
But the court concluded that, under its binding precedent, the
ADEA’s and Title VII’s federal-sector provisions required Babb to
establish but-for causation to support her claims. Second, the court
of appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on Babb’s Title VII gender discrimination claims and remanded for
further proceedings.
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Babb petitioned the Court for certiorari on the ADEA agediscrimination and Title VII gender-retaliation claims. The Court
granted Babb’s petition on the ADEA claim only.

CASE ANALYSIS
The ADEA’s federal-sector provision provides that “[a]ll personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment”
in executive agencies “who are at least 40 years of age * * *
shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” 29
U.S.C. § 633a(a) (emphasis added). In determining whether
a government personnel action is unlawful, the Court must
determine whether “based on” means that age is the but-for cause
of the discriminatory action, simply a factor in the government’s
action, or something in between, such as a “substantial”
motivating factor.
Babb argues that Section 633a(a), the ADEA’s federal-sector
provision, prohibits the federal government from making any
personnel action where age is a factor, giving three reasons in
support of that contention. First, Babb maintains that Section
633a(a)’s plain language—“free from any discrimination based
on age”—makes it unlawful to disfavor a federal employee based
on that employee’s age. Relatedly, the ADEA’s plain language is
reinforced by the ADEA’s purpose, to eliminate all discrimination
against older federal employees. Second, Section 633a(a)’s legal
and historical connection to Title VII’s federal-sector provision
conirms that but-for causation is not required. Third, if Section
633a(a)’s language is ambiguous, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) interpretation of that
language is entitled to Chevron deference.
Babb’s irst argument—the plain language argument—is itself
divided into a grammatical structure and a breadth-of-language
argument. As an initial matter, Babb contends that Section
633a(a)’s grammatical structure “creates an afirmative obligation
on the part of the government to undertake one of its functions
(“ma[king]” “personnel actions”) in a certain manner (“free
from any” age discrimination).” Pet. Brief at 22. Babb then
points out that Congress used “sweeping language” to deine that
obligation. For example, “free from” speciies that “personnel
actions must be entirely ‘relieved from’ or ‘clear’ of…even the
smallest amount of discrimination.” Moreover, the “word ‘any’
(‘free from any discrimination’) further emphasizes that the
process must be entirely without discrimination.” Similarly, the
word “discrimination” is a “broad term” with “broad reach.” And
the statutory phrase “based on” modiies “discrimination” and is
thus synonymous with the phrase “age discrimination.” Relatedly,
Babb appends a purpose argument here, maintaining that Section
633a(a)’s “broad command that any government personnel action
must be made without taking age into account” is consistent with
the ADEA’s “overriding goal of eliminating unfair bias against
older federal employees.”
Second, Babb argues that the legal and historical context in which
Congress enacted Section 633a(a) shows that but-for causation is
not required. Pet. Brief. at 27–42. As a threshold matter, Congress
patterned Section 633a(a) directly after Title VII’s federal-sector
provision, which has never required but-for causation and was
intended “to implement the Constitution’s guarantee of equal
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protection for federal employees.” This argument is supported
by “Title VII’s federal-sector provision,” which was “intended
to strengthen the federal government’s prior efforts to ban
discrimination in federal employment.” Relatedly, pre-Title VII
anti-discrimination policies applicable to federal employees as
relected in Executive Orders and as interpreted by the Civil
Service Commission have never required but-for causation.
Thus, when Congress enacted Section 633a(a), it ratiied the
then-current understanding of those anti-discrimination policies
and laws, which had never required but-for causation. Those
regulations continue to relect that understanding of the law as
applied to federal employees.
Babb closes with the multifaceted argument that the Court should
apply Chevron deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of Section
633a(a). Congress granted the EEOC the authority to “enforce the
provisions of [Section 633a(a)] through appropriate remedies”
and to “issue such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions as
it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities
under this section.” Pet. Brief at 40–41 (citing 29 U.S.C. §
633a(b)). Under well-established principles of administrative law,
Chevron applies to EEOC adjudicative or rule-based interpretations
of Section 633a. Babb notes the EEOC has consistently issued
adjudicated decisions and notice-and-comment rules interpreting
Section 633a(a) as not requiring but-for causation. Those
interpretations are reasonable and therefore entitled to deference,
concludes Babb.
In stark contrast to Babb, the government argues that Section
633a(a) requires a plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause
of the challenged personnel action, giving four reasons for its
contention. First, Section 633a(a)’s text requires but-for causation.
Second, the history of the ADEA’s federal-sector provision does
not support a lower causation standard. Third, the EEOC’s
interpretation of the ADEA does not support a lower causation
standard, and in any event that interpretation is not entitled to
Chevron deference. Fourth, a lower causation standard would
create signiicant anomalies in federal anti-discrimination law.
The government’s primary argument is a textualist one, claiming
that Section 633a(a)’s plain text requires but-for causation. The
textualist argument is divided into three parts—(1) a Supreme
Court trilogy has explained that “based on” means “because of;”
(2) without express statutory language to the contrary, the Court
must apply the default, common law, causation-in-fact rule; and
(3) Price Waterhouse and the 1991 congressional amendments to
Title VII support the reading of Section 633a(a) as requiring a butfor causation standard.
Three Supreme Court cases—Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr,
551 U.S. 47 (2007), University of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338 (2013), and Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167 (2009)—support the government’s textualist argument.
Accordingly, these cases explain that “based on” means “because
of,” which in turn means “by reason of: on account of.” Resp. Br.
at 16 (quoting Gross, (citation omitted)). Given Safeco, Nassar,
and Gross, the “ADEA’s prohibition against ‘discrimination
based on age,’…applies only where ‘age was the “reason” that
the employer decided to act,’ i.e., where ‘age was [a] “but-for”
cause of the employer’s adverse decision.’” Within that textualist
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cloak, the government then quarrels with Babb’s deinition of
discrimination—without considering age—arguing instead
that discrimination means “less favorable treatment of similarly
situated individuals” (citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (citations omitted) and Webster’s New
International Dictionary of the English Language 745 (2d ed.
1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It adds that “[i]t is
thus not enough for a federal employer merely to consider age…
when making a personnel action, if that consideration does not
actually cause the employer to make a less favorable personnel
action than it would have made for a similarly situated person who
is younger.”
To complement its textualist argument, the government next
argues that the default, common law, causation-in-fact rule—
“proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s
injury”—supports its plain language argument. Relying, once
again, on Nassar and Gross, the government explains that the
default rule applies to federal statutory claims of employment
discrimination, including claims under the ADEA. The government
emphasizes that these arguments were considered and rejected
in Safeco, Nassar, and Gross, in the context of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), Title VII’s private-sector retaliation
provision, and ADEA’s private-sector provision, respectively. Resp.
Br. at 18–22.
The government gives special attention to Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and Congress’s 1991 amendment
of Title VII’s private-sector discrimination provision, to show that
“Section 633a(a) should be read to require but-for causation.”
Resp. Br. at 22–24. There, the government argues that Price
Waterhouse “adopted a ‘but-for’ causation standard for liability”
and that Congress changed that standard by expressly adopting a
motivating factor standard—“a textual command that departs from
the default but-for rule.”
Second, the government claims that each of Babb’s historical
arguments lacks merit, conceding only that the federal-sector
ADEA was in fact modelled after Title VII’s federal-sector provision.
As an initial matter, the government asserts that whether
Congress intended to implement the Equal Protection Clause
through Title VII has no bearing on the ADEA, and to the extent
it does, the relevant constitutional provisions would require butfor causation for liability. In any event, the government insists
that these arguments cannot be squared with Gross or Nassar.
Resp. Brief at 34–36. The government next explains that Babb’s
cited executive orders do not support her plea for a diminished
causation standard in the federal sector, and more fundamentally,
even if they did, they could not supersede the statutory text. The
government then explains that there is no authority to show
that Congress intended to codify the then-current Civil Service
Commission regulations on which Babb relies.
Third, the government asserts that the EEOC regulations do not
support Babb’s construction of Section 633a(a). The government
then pivots to its more fundamental objection—that the EEOC
regulations are not entitled to Chevron deference primarily
because they cannot be squared with Section 633a(a)’s plain
language, common-law principles, or the Court’s precedent.
Resp. Brief at 45. The government adds that the regulations are
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also not relevant because they do not deal with the causation
standard for liability and have been amended, and even if relevant,
Babb’s construction of the regulation is not reasonable. Similarly,
the EEOC’s adjudicated decisions on which Babb relies are
inapposite. The government closes with a showing that Babb’s
construction would create asymmetrical interpretations of federal
discrimination law.
Both amici—the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP) and the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)—
support petitioner Babb. AARP argues that Section 633a(a)’s
plain language unambiguously calls for a “motivating factor”
causation standard and that this construction of Section 633a(a)
is supported by both the legislative history and every decisional
authority that has grappled with that provision’s text. Similarly,
the NTEU argues that Section 633a(a)’s plain language compels
reversal. Indeed, if a “but-for causation” standard is adopted, “a
plaintiff who fails to demonstrate that age was a determining
factor but nonetheless shows that it was one of several factors
would lose even though the challenged personnel action in that
scenario was not ‘free from any discrimination.’” NTEU Brief
at 5 (quoting Mabus). AARP further argues that this case is not
controlled by Gross and Nassar, which construed the private-sector
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA; Safeco, which construed the
FCRA; or common-law default rules that favor a but-for causation
standard.

SIGNIFICANCE
This case potentially presents several high-stakes questions
regarding older federal worker job security, intersectionality,
textualism, and Chevron deference.
Resolving the causation standard under Section 633a(a) is
important, especially to the 1.345 million federal employees
over age 40. AARP Brief at 3 n. 4. Age discrimination is the most
dificult type of discrimination to prove, and the federal workforce
is an aging one. The Court here has occasion to make those
cases more or perhaps less dificult to prove. And with the everincreasing federal debt, the government may be looking for ways
to shave its budget by eliminating the jobs of older workers, who
often command higher wages because of longevity pay.
This case also gives the Court an opportunity to discuss the
intersectionality of gender and age. As AARP points out, it is
likely not coincidental that the plaintiff-petitioner here is an older
female who was overlooked in favor of two younger men at the
VA. Were this case to go to trial, evidence might be placed in the
record showing that these two factors, gender and age, reinforced
or even enhanced the discriminatory effect of the other.
This case could also serve as a vehicle for promoting the Court’s
agenda on textualism, assuming such an agenda exists. Both
parties claim that the text reigns supreme here. The very fact
that both sides take a textualist approach with very few words
wasted on the purpose of workplace discrimination laws, shows
that counsel at least perceive the Court as highly receptive to
the textualist approach. This case could give us a clue as to the
textualist legacy that is likely to be a hallmark of the early twentyirst century Roberts Court.
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Finally, this case presents an opening for the Court to discuss, and
perhaps limit, Chevron deference. Although both parties claim that
Chevron deference does not apply because their interpretation of
the ADEA is plain—and therefore the Court can simply adopt that
interpretation without regard to the agency’s view—the Court
could decide that the phrase “based on” is in fact ambiguous. If
so, we will learn less about the Court’s approach to textualism and
more about its position on Chevron. Indeed, it might take the view
that “based on” is not only ambiguous but that it is the Court’s job,
not the agency’s, to disambiguate that statutory phrase.

Anne Marie Lofaso is the Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law at
the West Virginia University College of Law in Morgantown,
WV. She can be reached at 304.293.7356 or anne.lofaso@mail.
wvu.edu.
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